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"B" Reorganizations and the "Solely"
for Voting Stock Problem
Robert L. Merritt
HAVE BEEN ASKED to write an article that in brief and
simple terms explains the "B" reorganization definition to
general practitioners, and which, if possible, also focuses upon some-
thing of significance to practitioners who are familiar with the in-
tricacies of the federal income
tax law.
THE AUTHOR: ROBERT L. MERRITT There are a number of ex-
(B.S., City College of New York; LL.B., tensive and excellent articles
Columbia University) is a practicing on "B" reorganizations, to which
attorney in Cleveland, Ohio and a mem-
ber of the Cleveland and American Bar the reader with an actual stock
Associations. acquisition problem is referred.'
In this brief article I shall com-
ment further upon the "creep-
ing control" problem in "B" reorganizations which I have dealt
with at length in an earlier article' and which continues to trouble
those of us who must deal with the unfortunate Treasury regula-
tions on the subject.
Section 368(a)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code defines as
a tax-free "reorganization"
[T]he acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for
all or a part of its voting stock . . .of stock of another corpora-
tion if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corpora-
tion has control3 of such other corporation (whether or not such
1 Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Techniques in Corporate Acquisitions, 70
HARV. L. REV. 1183 (1957); Kanter, Cash in "B" Reorganization: Effect of Cash Pur-
chases on "Creeping" Reorganization, 19 TAX L. REV. 441 (1964); Vernava, The How-
ard and Turnbow Cases and the "Solely" Requirement of B Reorganizations, 20 TAX
L. REV. 387 (1965).
For a detailed analysis of alternative methods of bringing the newly acquired sub-
sidiary into the acquiring parent, and the problems attendant thereto, see MacLean,
"Creeping Acquisitions," 21 TAX L. REv. 345 (1966); Trimble, Creeping Control: An
Analysis of Tax Problems of the Multi-Stage Acquisition, 28 J. TAXATION 135 (1968).
2 Merritt, Tax-Free Corporate Acquisitions - The Law and the Proposed Regula-
tions, 53 MIcH. L. REV. 911 (1955).
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c) [hereinafter cited as CODE] defines "control"
as "the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number
of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation." (emphasis added).
Note that 80 percent of each class of voting stock of the acquired corporation is not
needed, but rather only 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all voting
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acquiring corporation had control immediately before the acqui-
sition). [Emphasis added.]
The parenthetical expression is the so-called "creeping control"
provision. In effect, the "creeping control" provision treats as if it
were acquired in exchange for voting stock, for "B" reorganization
definitional purposes, any stock of a corporation which is acquired
by another corporation prior to the transaction which results in the
latter acquiring (solely for its voting stock) sufficient additional
shares of the former to give it "control." Thus, section 368(a)
(1)(B) permits a tax-free acquisition of corporate stock (voting or
nonvoting) "in a single transaction or in a series of transactions
taking place over a relatively short period of time such as 12
months,"4 if the stock so acquired (if acquired solely for voting
stock) plus stock previously acquired (no matter how acquired),
represents the requisite 80 percent needed for "control." It is no
longer necessary, as it may have been under the 1939 Code, for the
stock previously acquired (in an independent transaction) to have
also been acquired solely for voting stock. However, the "series of
transactions taking place over a relatively short period of time"
language in the Treasury regulations, interpreting the "creeping
control" provision which is intended to grant relief from a 'burden-
some result under the 1939 Code, can itself inflict unexpected tax
burdens on the shareholders of the acquired corporation. Let us
see how.
The example of "creeping control" given in the Treasury regu-
lations is troublesome. It reads:
Corporation A purchased 30 percent of the common stock of Cor-
poration W (the only dass of stock outstanding) for cash in 1939.
On March 1, 1955, Corporation A offers to exchange its own vot-
ing stock for all the stock of Corporation W tendered within 6
months from the date of the offer. Within the 6 months' period
Corporation A acquires an additional 60 percent of the stock of
Corporation W solely for its own voting stock, so that it owns 90
percent of the stock of Corporation W. No gain or loss is recog-
classes. As to nonvoting stock, the statute seems to require acquisition of only 80 per-
cent of the total number of shares of all classes of nonvoting stock without regard to
fair market values. However, Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 115, rules (erro-
neously in my opinion) that the acquiring corporation must secure at least 80 percent
in number of each class of nonvoting stock. A contrary view to Revenue Ruling 59-259
appears to have been taken in Reg. 62, am 1566(c), Example (3). See A. BAAR & G.
MoRRs, HIDDEN TAXEs IN CORPORATE RiEORGANIZATIONS 157-58 (1935).
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1955). For a discussion of a "single transaction" see
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A132-33 (1954). See also Merritt, Tax-Free
Acquisition of Corporate Business, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 693, 723-25
(1955).
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nized with respect to the exchanges of stock of Corporation A for
stock of Corporation W. For this purpose, it is immaterial
whether such exchanges occurred before Corporation A acquired
control (80 percent) of Corporation W or after such control was
acquired. If Corporation A had acquired 80 percent of the stock
of Corporation W for cash in 1939, it could likewise acquire some
or all of the remainder of such stock solely in exchange for its own
voting stock without recognition of gain or loss.5
Why the 16-year spread between the time of acquisition of
stock for cash (1939) and the time of acquisition of additional
stock constituting "control" solely for voting stock (1955)? This
is a good "safe" separate transaction example, but hardly a guide to
the perplexed.
Suppose Corporation P acquires, for cash, either in the open
market or through a private placement, stock of Corporation S.
Thereafter, Corporation P for the first time makes a tender offer to
the general public to acquire additional shares solely for a part of
its voting stock. Under these facts, is the initial acquisition for cash
to be regarded as a separate transaction? If not, does this mean
that no shares can ever, with reasonable assurance, be acquired for
cash by a corporation which contemplates the possibility of making
a tender offer within the next several years without the corporation
being in danger of failing to qualify for "B" reorganization treat-
ment? Even if the acquisition for cash were not regarded as a sep-
arate transaction, would the tender offer nevertheless result in a
tax-free exchange of shares under section 368(a)(1)(B) if, as a re-
sult of such offer an additional 80 percent of Corporation S's stock
were acquired solely for voting stock of Corporation P? Or would
the cash transaction taint the later transaction, even though the
tender offer, standing alone, resulted in the acquisition of "control"
solely for voting stock?
Whether the two transactions will be treated as separate for
advance rulings purposes, or whether this will be considered to be
a question of fact as to which no private ruling letter will be issued
in advance, is likely to be a matter of great concern. How does
one, soliciting the tender of shares, write an effective as well as
accurate prospectus in such circumstances, if the Revenue Service
will not rule (even apart from the question of whether it will rule
promptly), or if it rules that the tender offer will not result in tax-
free exchanges? This latter situation appears to be what happened
when Solitron Devices, Incorporated recently attempted to acquire
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (c) (1955).
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control of Amphenol Corporation through a stock-for-stock tender
offer.'
Less than a month before it made its tender offer, Solitron
bought a small amount (less than 1 percent) of the outstanding
stock of Amphenol for cash through a brokerage house. An Amph-
enol shareholder, seeking an advance ruling as to the tax conse-
quences of accepting the tender offer, indicated to the Reorganiza-
tion Branch of the National Office of the Internal Revenue Service
that "a portion of such Amphenol stock was purchased by Solitron
with the subsequent acquisition of Amphenol in mind."'  The Re-
organization Branch, in its ruling letter, treated the cash purchase
and the subsequent acquisition of stock by Solitron as a result of the
tender offer, as part of a single plan to acquire control of Amphe-
nol, with the result that the tender offer was held to not meet the
"B" reorganization rules "since the exchange is not solely for voting
stock of Solitron."'
Thus, in the Internal Revenue Service's view, a cash purchase,
followed by a tender offer of a stock-for-stock exchange, may result
in a taxable transaction, unless the tender offer and the cash pur-
chase are widely separated in time and are dearly independent trans-
actions. Conversely, where the requisite 80 percent "control" of a
corporation is acquired solely for voting stock of the acquiring cor-
poration, thus meeting the "B" reorganization rules, the "B" re-
organization may nevertheless retroactively be disqualified if sub-
sequently the acquiring corporation acquires additional shares of
the acquired corporation for cash. Therefore, unless the exchanging
shareholders in a "B" reorganization obtain a warranty from the
acquiring corporation that it has not in the past and will not in the
future acquire additional shares of the acquired corporation for cash
in a transaction which would have the effect of disqualifying the
stock-for-stock exchange as a tax-free exchange, or, even better,
that it has not acquired and will not acquire such stock for cash
under any circumstances, the exchanging shareholders can not be
certain that their acceptance of a tender offer will 'result in a tax-
free exchange.'
6 See Letter from John F. Bogaard, Chief, Reorganization Branch of the Internal
Revenue Service, to Richard E. Hall, Feb. 21, 1968.
7Id.
8aId.
0 See MacLean, supra note 1, at 368-69. The warranty should be even broader, and
refer to any act which would disqualify the exchanges pursuant to the tender offer as
taxfree under CODE § 368 (a) (1) (B). For example, a subsequent bringing of the assets
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One way the acquiring corporation may be able to live with
such a warranty would be to have the acquired corporation redeem
for cash any shares which may become available after the "B" re-
organization takes place. Such an acquisition for cash should not
disqualify the "B" reorganization, even if accomplished prior to
the stock-for-stock exchange, ° provided that sufficient shareholders
participate in the stock-for-stock exchange to meet the "continuity
of interest" test."
Granted the assumption in the Solitron-Amphenol ruling that
the acquisition of Amphenol stock by Solitron for cash was part of
a plan of Solitron to later acquire "control" of Amphenol through
a stock-for-stock tender offer, I would like to suggest that the ruling
is wrong. This suggestion accords with a thesis of an earlier arti-
cle of mine,' 2 which has been endorsed by subsequent writers,13
and which I will briefly further develop here.
Howard v. Commissioner4 held (under the 1939 Code) that
there could be no "B'" reorganization where some stock of the ac-
quired corporation was acquired for cash, even though at the same
time "control" was acquired solely for voting stock. Although
neither the Tax Court's nor the Seventh Circuit's opinion attached
significance to this fact, it appears that in the Howard case what
was involved was the acquisition of 79.82 percent of Binkley Coal
Company's common stock (3,683 shares) solely for voting stock of
Truax-Traer Coal Company. In addition, 18.01 percent of the
Binkley shareholders (831 shares) received solely cash, and Parsons
College, a 2.17 percent shareholder of Binkley (100 shares), re-
ceived Truax-Traer stock for 17 Binkley shares plus cash for 83
shares of Binkley stock.'" If the acquisition of the 100 shares of
Binkley common stock owned by Parsons College were treated as a
of the acquired corporation into the acquiring corporation could under some circum-
stances destroy the "B" reorganization. See MacI.ean, supra note 1; Trimble, supra
note 1.
10 Rev. Rul. 68-285, 1968 INT. REV. BULL. No. 23, at 17. The acquiring corpora-
tion may not pay the dissenting shareholders nor reimburse the acquired corporation for
its payments to the dissenting shareholders.
11 See Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 1232, which sets forth a 50 percent
continuity of interest rule for advance rulings purposes.
12 See Merritt, supra note 2.
13 See Kanter, supra note 1; Rosenzweig, The "Boot" Peril: What is "Solely" Under
Section 368(a)?, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 995 (1966); Vernava, supra note 1.
14 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'g 24 T.C. 792 (1955).
15 Parsons College exchanged 17 shares of Binkley common stock for 544 shares of
Truax-Traer, and also sold 83 shares of Binkley common stock for cash at a price of
$400 per share, or a total price of $33,200. Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792,
800 (1955).
"B" REORGANIZATIONS
unitary transaction, namely, as if all 100 shares were acquired from
Parsons College for Truax-Traer stock plus cash - in which event
80 percent "control" would not have been acquired by Truax-Traer
solely for a portion of its voting stock - there would dearly have
been no "B" reorganization. Nevertheless, the documentation of
the exchange and purchase offers in Howard was carefully drawn
to preclude such an interpretation, and the courts did not rest their
decisions upon (or even discuss) this point.
The Seventh Circuit decided that a nontaxable exchange took
place in the Howard case even though it agreed with the Tax Court
that the "B" reorganization definition had not been met. This
latter proposition was based on a so-called "but for" interpretation
of the 'boot" provisions of the 1939 Code,"6 the details of which
are not important to this discussion, because the court's interpreta-
tion was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Turnbow v. Commissioner." What is important here,
however, is that in the Turnbow case the Supreme Court made it
very dear that it was not passing upon the interpretation of the "B"
reorganization definition in Howard, the validity of which it left an
open question.'" In this connection it is significant that in its brief
before the Supreme Court in Turzbow the Government stated:
It cannot be said with certainty ... that there could not be "other
property" in a transaction qualifying as a "B" or "C" reorganiza-
tion. While those definitions do literally require that "solely...
voting stock" be given, that requirement raises questions of in-
terpretation (not involved in this case) that have not yet been
finally resolved. For example, since § 112 (g) (1) (B) requires
only that 80% of the stock of another corporation be acquired, it
is arguable that that definition is met if the consideration allocable
to at least 80% of the stock consists of voting stock, notwithstand-
ing that the acquiring corporation also acquires additional shares
10 238 F.2d at 948.
"7 368 U.S. 337 (1961), af'g 286 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
18 In Lutkins v. United States, 312 F.2d 803 (Ct Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825
(1963), 65.375 percent of S Corporation's stock was acquired by P Corporation in 1912
solely for voting stock; in the period 1929-1953, 2.69 percent was acquired for cash;
and in 1952, 29.49 percent was acquired solely for voting stock. The Commissioner
argued that there was no "B" reorganization unless P Corporation acquired 80 percent
"control" of S Corporation in one transaction solely for its voting stock. The Court of
Claims held that there was no "B" reorganization in 1952 because (a) the 1952 trans-
action did not involve the acquisition of 80 percent of S Corporation's stock, and (b)
the cash transactions prior to 1952 had to be taken into account. Judge Whitaker, dis-
senting, was of the opinion that 80 percent "control" was acquired solely for voting
stock, and that "the acquisition for cash of the small percentage of 2.69 percent, being
wholly unrelated to the plan of reorganization, is to be disregarded." 312 F.2d at 807.
It would appear, however, that the dissenting judge distinguished Howard on the facts,
neither accepting nor rejecting its legal conclusion.
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(e.g., from dissenting stockholders) for money or other property.
That was in fact the situation in the Howard case, in which the
acquiring corporation gave solely voting stock for 81% of the
shares but gave cash to a dissenting minority for the remaining
199. While the Seventh Circuit held that the cash given the
minority precluded a "B" reorganization, the question is a debat-
able one and there is no assurance that other courts would follow
that decision.19
Not only is there no assurance that other courts will follow the
Howard decision under the 1939 Code, but tax commentators are
of the view that Howard was incorrectly decided, that in any event
there is no need to follow it under the 1954 Code, and that even-
tually the "B" reorganization definition will be held to be met if
the consideration allocable to at least 80 percent of the acquired
corporation's stock consists solely of voting stock of the acquiring
corporation, notwithstanding that the acquiring corporation also ac-
quires additional shares for money or other property.2 If the Treas-
ury is not willing to amend its regulations or its tax ruling policy to
accord with this view, it should sponsor or support legislation which
would clarify the applicable rule.
It is not likely, however, that the Treasury Department will
readily abandon its present interpretation of the "B" reorganization
definition. Even in the case of an obviously incorrect statement in
the reorganization regulations it has failed to make an appropriate
modification. Some years ago, when the proposed regulations un-
der the 1954 Code were under consideration, I commented21 on
the desirability of modifying the longstanding regulations' require-
ment that "[tlhe plan of reorganization must be adopted by each
of the corporations parties thereto . *. .."" to make clear that the
requirement does not apply to "B" reorganizations. Such a modifi-
cation is necessary because the regulations also provide that both
the acquiring and the acquired corporation in a "B" reorganization
are each a party to the reorganization.23
The fact of the matter is that in the case of many a tender offer,
19 Brief for Respondent at 21 n.7, Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 337 (1961).
20 See Merritt, supra note 2, at 926-36; Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 1019; Ver-
nava, supra note 1, at 404-09. See also articles cited in Kanter, supra note 1, at 454
n.37.
21 See Merritt, supra note 2, at 925-27.
22Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3 (a) (1955). The provisions of this section were origi-
nally included in Reg. 86, art. 112(g)-6(a), interpreting the Revenue Act of 1934.
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (f) (1955). Note that a corporate party to a reorganiza-
tion agreement is not necessarily a party to a reorganization. Groman v. Commissioner,
302 U.S. 82 (1937); See R. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAxATION 106-08 (3d Series
1940).
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the board of directors of the corporation whose stock is sought to
be acquired by the would-be acquiring corporation, not only does not
take affirmative action to adopt a plan of reorganization, but the
board is often strenuously opposed to the "take over." The situa-
tion is described in a recent article: 4
Under the typical state corporation law the board of directors
is necessarily involved in any transaction of merger or sale of assets.
The transaction involves a corporate act, carried out ultimately by
the stockholders' exercise of their voting power but in the first
instance depending upon favorable action of the board. At both
board and stockholder levels, approval by the requisite majority is
binding upon the entire body, but the stockholders never get a
chance to accept or reject unless the board first acts favorably.
In theory at least, none of this is true of the normal tender
offer. In the center of things stands T Company, with its existing
management and its presently outstanding securities. The owners
of the stock are addressed as a group, through a letter or adver-
tisement, but they are asked merely to make individual decisions
to sell to A; and resulting transactions are between sellers and a
buyer of outstanding stock, not corporate transactions at all.2 5
While the foregoing remarks are addressed to tender offers for
cash, they are equally appropriate to tender offers solely for voting
stock2  of the offeror. Clearly, in view of the realities of tender
offers, the regulations should be amended because they go too far,
and their continued presence represents an unnecessary and unwar-
ranted threat of possible future conflict.
24 Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 BUs. LAw. 611 (1968).
25 Id. at 616-17.
2
6 Quaere whether a voting preferred stock which by its terms is convertible into
voting common stock constitutes solely voting stock. Is the conversion privilege
"boot"? In view of recent discussion of whether convertible debentures may be deemed
to have an original issue discount feature because of the value of the conversion right
(see 28 J. TAXATION 142 (1968)), this could be a question of developing importance.
See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b) (2) (i), 29 Fed. Reg. 12,078 (1964), which
states that "[i~n the case of an obligation which is convertible into stock or another ob-
ligation, the issue price includes any amount paid in respect of the conversion privilege."
Compare 28 J. TAXATION 142 (1968), with T.M.M. 68-1, 10 (Jan. 1, 1968), discuss-
ing the Service's alleged views on whether voting stock of an acquiring corporation which
is convertible into the voting stock of the acquiring corporation's parent, can be given in
a "B" or "'C" reorganization.
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